Excessive Agency and Tool Risk
Excessive Agency and Tool Risk
Key jargon
| Term | Plain-language meaning |
|---|---|
| Excessive agency | Giving an AI system more functions, permissions, autonomy, or impact than its task requires. |
| Authorization | The decision that a specific identity may perform a specific action on a specific resource. |
| Confused deputy | A privileged component tricked into misusing its authority for another party. |
| Reversibility | How easily an action and its consequences can be undone. |
Key concepts
- Model intent is not authorization; every consequential tool request needs independent policy enforcement.
- Reduce risk by limiting available tools, arguments, identities, duration, rate, scope, and transaction value.
Concept map
flowchart LR
A["Model proposes action"] --> B["Bind user identity and scope"]
B --> C["Authorize and confirm consequence"]
C --> D["Execute minimally and record"]Agency risk grows with tool breadth, credential privilege, data reach, action irreversibility, autonomy duration, environmental uncertainty, and weak supervision.
Reduce agency
- Give task-specific tools rather than a shell or universal API.
- Use short-lived, scoped credentials bound to user/tenant.
- Separate read, propose, approve, and commit.
- Constrain targets and arguments with policy.
- Sandbox generated code and network access.
- Set step, cost, and effect budgets.
- Preserve idempotency and outcome reconciliation.
- Provide an independent kill switch.
Exercise
Replace a hypothetical run_any_command tool with five narrow capabilities. Define identity, resource constraints, and approval for each.