Mobility Research Guideline — Initial Entry Vectors (Equipment & Site Focus)
Mobility Research Guideline — Initial Entry Vectors
BLUF. An initial entry vector (IV) here means the first physical asset, field device, or exposed network endpoint a researcher reaches — cell-site cabinet, RRU, site router, splice handhole, rogue radio at the tower perimeter, or an internet-exposed management interface tied to RAN/transport. This guide catalogs what equipment matters, what to bring to assess it, what this program has exercised, and what is still unexercised. Protocol attacks (SS7, Diameter, SIP) are downstream of these footholds; they are not IVs in this document.
How to use this document
| If you need… | Go to… |
|---|---|
| Map a cell site and name every attackable asset | Site asset map |
| Pick an IV by equipment type | IV catalog by asset |
| Pack for a tower/cabinet visit | Field researcher kit |
| Pack for lab work that simulates site gear | Lab kit |
| See what we have already run | Exercised IVs |
| Hardware/procurement backlog | Unexercised IVs |
| Full site test matrix | open5gs_lab/18_test_plan_mobility_site_to_core |
| Your owned RF stack | Support_Hardware_Lab_Equipment |
Operating rules
- Asset first. Name the box, cabinet, or exposed IP before naming the protocol.
- Outside-in. OSINT/shodan → passive RF from public land → escorted cabinet → lab replica of same asset class.
- Lab calibrates field. Use Open5GS + srsRAN + CellScope so you know what “normal” looks like before interpreting a live site (0. Methodology).
- Authorization defines scope. Touching tower hardware without escort is out of scope; documenting exposed management from OSINT may be AL0.
- Evidence every time. Photos (where allowed), port labels, serial/console capture, config export, PCAP from SPAN — not narrative alone.
What counts as an IV (and what does not)
| Is an IV | Is not an IV (post-foothold) |
|---|---|
| Compromised site router management plane | SS7 MAP query from leased GT |
| BBU/DU serial console or firmware dump | Diameter fraud on IPX |
| RRU/O-RU flash or default credential | SIP header confusion in IMS core |
| Exposed RET/AISG controller on site LAN | Kubernetes SSRF between core NFs |
| Handhole/splice physical access | BGP hijack in transit AS |
| Rogue gNB/eNB at tower line-of-sight (portable SDR) | Subscriber CRM breach |
| GNSS/PTP antenna or timing server at site | MongoDB lateral move in core cloud |
Site asset map (where IVs live)
Typical macro site and immediate edge. IV research starts on red nodes — things you can see, touch, scan, or impersonate from the perimeter.
flowchart TB
subgraph PERIM["Perimeter / public"]
UE["Test handset / drive-test phone"]
ROGUE["Portable rogue eNB/gNB\nSDR + laptop"]
OSINT["Internet-exposed mgmt\nShodan / Censys hits"]
end
subgraph TOWER["Tower / rooftop / monopole"]
ANT["Panel / massive MIMO antennas"]
RET["RET / AISG tilt controllers"]
RRU["RRU / RRH / O-RU"]
GPS["GNSS antenna"]
end
subgraph CAB["Ground cabinet / hut"]
DU["BBU / DU / CU shelf"]
SW["Site router / switch"]
SYNC["PTP grandmaster / sync module"]
PWR["Rectifier / battery / ATS"]
ENV["Environmental / access controller"]
CRAFT["Craft port\nUSB-serial / RJ45 console"]
OOB["OOB LTE/modem / IP-KVM"]
CAM["CCTV / tamper sensor"]
end
subgraph PLANT["Outside plant"]
HAND["Handhole / manhole / splice tray"]
MW["Microwave backhaul radio"]
FIB["Fiber termination / mux"]
end
subgraph EDGE["Customer / small cell edge"]
SC["Small cell / DAS hub"]
CPE["Fixed-wireless CPE / outdoor router"]
end
UE -->|"IV-A1 passive scan"| ANT
ROGUE -->|"IV-A2 rogue cell"| UE
OSINT -->|"IV-B1 exposed WebUI/SSH"| SW
OSINT -->|"IV-B2"| DU
CRAFT -->|"IV-C1 local console"| DU
RRU -->|"IV-C2 flash / serial"| DU
RET -->|"IV-C3 unauth tilt bus"| ANT
HAND -->|"IV-D1 splice / tap"| FIB
FIB --> SW
SW --> DU
GPS --> SYNC
SYNC --> DU
SC --> SW
CPE --> SW
style ROGUE fill:#d62828,color:#fff
style OSINT fill:#d62828,color:#fff
style CRAFT fill:#d62828,color:#fff
style RRU fill:#e76f51,color:#fff
style HAND fill:#e76f51,color:#fff
style DU fill:#e76f51,color:#fffTrust boundary rule: Anything in CAB or PLANT that speaks IPsec, MPLS, or fronthaul toward core is a bridge from physical site → regional core. Orange Core-ruption class findings often start at BBU + IPsec secrets, not at AMF APIs.
IV catalog by asset
Each row is a candidate first foothold. “Researcher kit” is what you carry to validate or simulate that asset.
A — Air interface & subscriber edge (no cabinet access)
| IV ID | Asset / exposure | How researcher reaches it | Researcher kit | Typical gain if weak | Exercised? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IV-A1 | Serving macro cell (PCI/TAC/PLMN) | Public roads, rooftops, parking lots | Test UE, CellScope/pixel, FlipperZero5G, passive scanner apps |
Cell inventory, neighbor anomalies, rogue-cell detection baseline | Partial — AL1 inventory |
| IV-A2 | Portable rogue eNB/gNB (researcher-owned) | Faraday cage or licensed isolated lab | B210mini, antennas, srsRAN, Faraday enclosure (Support_Hardware_Lab_Equipment) |
Force attach, IMSI exposure, downgrade toward 2G leg | Full — AL4 lab |
| IV-A3 | UE baseband via malicious cell | Same as IV-A2 + owned test phone | Pixel 9 (root), isolated SIM, malicious gNB | Modem crash/RCE research lane | Not exercised OTA |
| IV-A4 | Small cell / femtocell / DAS radio visible on site | Walk survey, building roof | Directional antenna, UE logs | Indoor coverage hijack, weaker physical security than macro | Not exercised |
B — Internet-exposed & WAN-facing devices (no physical access)
| IV ID | Asset / exposure | How researcher reaches it | Researcher kit | Typical gain if weak | Exercised? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IV-B1 | Site router / L3 switch (Telnet, SSH, HTTP, SNMP, TR-069) | OSINT, operator IP ranges | nmap, routeros/vendor scripts, cred audit checklist |
Route injection, mirror port, VPN creds to core | Not exercised |
| IV-B2 | BBU/DU WebUI or EMS agent on public IP | Shodan/Censys, mis-scoped ACL | Browser, default-cred lists, TLS inspect | Config download, alarm clear, software upgrade path | Not exercised |
| IV-B3 | RET / AISG / antenna controller on routable IP | Scan site address space from AL3 read-only | SNMP walk, Modbus/AISG tools | Antenna point-away DoS, maintenance mode | Not exercised |
| IV-B4 | OOB management (cellular modem, IP-KVM, iDRAC) on site | OSINT, vendor VPN leak | Modem band scan, VPN config review | Persistent out-of-band into cabinet | Tabletop only |
| IV-B5 | CPE / fixed-wireless outdoor unit at enterprise | Customer-edge survey | Default cred scan, TR-069 | Backhaul into private APN | Not exercised |
C — Cabinet / hut (escorted physical access — AL2)
| IV ID | Asset / exposure | How researcher reaches it | Researcher kit | Typical gain if weak | Exercised? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IV-C1 | Craft / console port (RJ45, USB-serial) on DU/router | Open cabinet, escorted | USB-serial adapters, console cables, screen/minicom |
Local admin, bootloader, factory reset | Tabletop — TC-06 checklist |
| IV-C2 | RRU/RRH service port & flash | Tower climb or ground RRH cabinet | Vendor service cable, JTAG where documented | Firmware dump, IPsec PSK, hardcoded creds | Not exercised — Core-ruption class |
| IV-C3 | BBU/DU removable storage / firmware partition | Cabinet | Laptop, vendor recovery image, dd |
VPN profiles, certificates, core peer IPs | Not exercised |
| IV-C4 | Site switch local management | Patch panel + management VLAN | Laptop on maintenance port | VLAN hop to fronthaul/backhaul | Not exercised |
| IV-C5 | GNSS / PTP module | Cabinet rear panel | PTP monitor, GNSS spoof gen (lab only) | Timing holdover failure → RAN degrade | Not exercised |
| IV-C6 | Power / ENV controller (rectifier SNMP, dry contacts) | Cabinet | SNMP tools, serial | Hidden management path, alarm suppression | Tabletop — TC-07/08 |
| IV-C7 | Unlocked / shared badge physical access | Social + physical | Checklist, photos | Any of the above without logging | Tabletop — TC-05 |
D — Outside plant & transport (fiber / microwave)
| IV ID | Asset / exposure | How researcher reaches it | Researcher kit | Typical gain if weak | Exercised? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IV-D1 | Handhole / manhole / splice tray | Street cabinet survey | Flashlight, OTDR, clip-on tap demo | Passive optical tap, inline splitter | Not exercised |
| IV-D2 | Fiber mux / WDM in hut | AL2 hut access | Optical power meter, port labels | Unencrypted backhaul era capture | Tabletop — TC-09 |
| IV-D3 | Microwave backhaul radio IDU/ODU | Tower or hut | Ethernet to radio management | Clear-text management, pivot to router | Not exercised |
| IV-D4 | Fronthaul SFP / eCPRI port on DU | Cabinet patch panel | TAP (AL3 SPAN), optics labels | Observe cleartext fronthaul where no MACsec | Not exercised |
E — Indoor / enterprise edge (non-macro)
| IV ID | Asset / exposure | How researcher reaches it | Researcher kit | Typical gain if weak | Exercised? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IV-E1 | Indoor small cell (enterprise, mall, stadium) | Building telecom closet | UE survey, closet photo checklist | Weaker locks, shared IT VLAN | Not exercised |
| IV-E2 | DAS head-end | Venue IDF | Same as E1 | Multi-carrier exposure | Not exercised |
| IV-E3 | Private 5G lab cell on customer LAN | Authorized enterprise | Laptop, nmap |
Jump from IT to RAN management | Not exercised |
Field researcher kit (site & edge)
Pack for AL1–AL2 when the goal is equipment-centric IV discovery.
| Category | Items | Used for IVs |
|---|---|---|
| Identity & safety | Escort badge, PPE, flashlight, camera (policy-permitting), gloves | C7, all cabinet work |
| Console | USB-serial (FTDI), RJ45 rollover, USB-C adapters, labeled cable bag | C1, C2 |
| Network | Small managed switch, laptop with nmap, tcpdump, Wireshark, offline cred checklist |
B1–B4, C4 |
| RF passive | Test phone, FlipperZero5G, pad/pencil for PCI map | A1, A4 |
| Optical | Visual fault locator, power meter (if authorized touch fiber) | D1, D2 |
| Evidence | Tamper-evident tags, notebook, asset label stickers | All |
| Do not bring to live macro | Transmitting SDR without license + cage | A2 only in lab |
Full RF/active stack: Support_Hardware_Lab_Equipment, Support_Hardware_Pixel9.
Lab kit (simulated site & RAN)
Use this to exercise IV mechanics without touching operator gear.
| Lab stand-in for site asset | Stack | Exercises IV |
|---|---|---|
| gNB/eNB + core | lab/ Open5GS + srsRAN ZMQ or USRP + Faraday |
A2, partial A3 |
| Subscriber device | UERANSIM or Pixel + sysmocom SIM | A1 comparison |
| “Site router” | Docker network + Linux router VM, intentional weak mgmt | B1 (simulated) |
| DU management | Open5GS container host SSH exposure drills | B2 (simulated) |
| Fronthaul tap | tap profile, SPAN on docker bridge |
D4 (simulated) |
| Identity exposure | LTESniffer on srsRAN cell | A2 side-channel |
Post-attach core tests (open5gs_lab/19_checklist_network_joined) are not IVs — they assume you already joined as a UE or compromised a core component.
Exercised initial entry vectors
Equipment- and exposure-focused only.
| ID | IV | Asset class | Status | Where / how | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| E-01 | IV-A2 Rogue lab gNB/eNB | Portable SDR + software BTS | Full AL4 | ~/code/CodeCollector/mobility/lab srsRAN + Faraday |
Attach PCAP, CellScope FBS score |
| E-02 | IV-A1 Passive cell inventory | Macro/serving cell | Partial AL1 | Test UE, drive-walk methodology in Phase3_RF_Air_Interface | Cell list, PCI/TAC log |
| E-03 | IV-A2 IMSI / identity in lab cell | Lab RRU equivalent (SDR) | Partial AL4 | LTESniffer + srsRAN (Support_Hardware_Lab_Equipment) | Uplink PCAP with IMSI |
| E-04 | IV-C1/C7 Cabinet checklist | Craft, locks, badges | Tabletop AL2 | open5gs_lab/18_test_plan_mobility_site_to_core TC-05, TC-06 | Photos, checklist sign-off |
| E-05 | IV-C6 / IV-D2 Transport segmentation review | Hut fiber/router | Tabletop AL3 | TC-09, Theory_Fiber_Telecom_Infrastructure | Diagram + config review |
| E-06 | IV-B1 Simulated exposed router | Lab VM “site router” | Not started in field | No production OSINT exercise logged | — |
Honest gap: Almost all real tower equipment IVs (RRU flash, BBU firmware, RET, handhole tap, Shodan on live site gear) are unexercised.
Unexercised initial entry vectors (research backlog)
Prioritized for equipment acquisition and authorized site access. P1 = can start with procurement or AL2 escort; P2 = needs climb/vendor gear; P3 = specialized optical/legal.
| ID | IV | Asset | Why it matters | Blocker | Next step | Pri |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| U-01 | IV-C2 | RRU/RRH service port → firmware | IPsec keys to 5GC (Core-ruption path) | No vendor RRH on bench | Acquire decommissioned RRH; document console/boot flow | P1 |
| U-02 | IV-C3 | BBU/DU flash dump | Same as U-01; cleartext VPN profiles | No BBU/DU hardware | Orange-style hardware pentest checklist from talk | P1 |
| U-03 | IV-B1 | OSINT on site routers | Common real-world entry (weak WAN mgmt) | No scoped IP ranges | AL0 procedure: document search methodology only | P1 |
| U-04 | IV-B2 | Exposed DU/EMS WebUI | Remote config without cabinet | No target ranges | Lab VM mimic + Shodan query template | P1 |
| U-05 | IV-C1 | Live craft console capture | Local admin on DU | Needs escorted site | TC-06 with serial capture allowed | P1 |
| U-06 | IV-D1 | Handhole / splice access | Fiber tap IV | No tap kit | Procure clip-on tap + Theory_Fiber_Telecom_Infrastructure practical | P1 |
| U-07 | IV-A4 | Indoor small cell closet | Weaker physical + VLAN | No venue access | Enterprise small-cell survey template | P1 |
| U-08 | IV-C3 | Default creds on cabinet gear | Router/switch/RET factory passwords | No live gear | Build cred matrix per vendor (Nokia/Ericsson/Huawei/Cisco) | P1 |
| U-09 | IV-C5 | GNSS/PTP degradation | RAN timing DoS | No site timing gear | Lab GPS spoof only; site = tabletop | P2 |
| U-10 | IV-D3 | Microwave radio management | Hut IDU with Ethernet mgmt | No IDU | Photo survey template from AL2 | P2 |
| U-11 | IV-D4 | Fronthaul TAP | eCPRI/ORAN observation | No split-RAN | Docker SPAN exercise; field needs AL3 TAP | P2 |
| U-12 | IV-B3 | RET/AISG controller | Antenna mispoint / maintenance | No controller IP | SNMP sweep procedure on lab switch | P2 |
| U-13 | IV-B4 | OOB modem / IP-KVM | Stealth persistence | Rare in lab | Inventory question on TC-06 | P2 |
| U-14 | IV-A3 | OTA baseband via rogue gNB | UE modem RCE | Handset + malicious cell in cage | Extend Faraday lab; Black Hat talk refs | P2 |
| U-15 | IV-E2 | DAS head-end | Multi-operator closet | Venue access | Checklist only | P3 |
| U-16 | IV-B5 | Customer CPE on private APN | Enterprise bridge to mobility | Customer scope | Partner engagement | P3 |
Coverage snapshot (equipment IVs)
| Asset zone | Exercised | Unexercised backlog |
|---|---|---|
| A — Air / UE | 3 partial/full (E-01..03) | U-07, U-14 |
| B — Exposed IP devices | 0 field (E-06 not started) | U-03, U-04, U-08, U-12, U-13, U-16 |
| C — Cabinet / tower | 2 tabletop (E-04,05) | U-01, U-02, U-05, U-08, U-09 |
| D — Outside plant | 1 tabletop (E-05) | U-06, U-10, U-11 |
| E — Indoor edge | 0 | U-07, U-15 |
Suggested procurement order: decommissioned RRH/BBU (U-01/U-02) → optical tap demo kit (U-06) → console cable set for first escorted IV-C5 (U-05).
Recommended research sequence (equipment-first)
flowchart LR
S1[AL0 OSINT\nIV-B1/B2 templates] --> S2[AL1 passive RF\nIV-A1 inventory]
S2 --> S3[AL4 lab rogue cell\nIV-A2/A3]
S3 --> S4[AL2 escorted site\nIV-C/D checklists]
S4 --> S5[Bench hardware\nIV-C2/C3 RRU/BBU]
S5 --> S6[Update exercised table]- Run IV-A1 on known cells with test phone + CellScope.
- Run IV-A2 in Faraday with B210mini (Support_Hardware_Lab_Equipment).
- Complete TC-05/06/09 tabletop for a real or sample site photo set.
- Acquire bench RRU/BBU and work U-01/U-02 offline.
- Only then extend to handhole/optical (U-06) and OSINT on routers (U-03) under written scope.
After foothold (not IVs)
Once an asset IV succeeds, operators and talks describe movement toward:
| From asset foothold | Common next targets |
|---|---|
| Site router or BBU VPN | 5GC AMF/SMF segment, orchestration LAN |
| RRU with IPsec secret | First-hop NF (AMF), management VLAN |
| Rogue cell at perimeter | UE IMSI, NAS downgrade, subscriber intercept |
| Fiber tap | Cleartext backhaul (legacy) or encrypted flow metadata |
| Exposed DU WebUI | Software upgrade channel, credential reuse |
Detail for core protocol testing remains in open5gs_lab/19_checklist_network_joined, open5gs_lab/TP-03_sbi_security, open5gs_lab/TP-04_gtp_userplane. Use those after documenting which equipment IV would have enabled the path.
Source corpus
- NLM notebook
mobility: notebook link — prioritize Core-ruption (BBU/site), HITB downgrade (rogue cell), fiber tap, srsRAN/LTESniffer lab videos. - Site test plan: open5gs_lab/18_test_plan_mobility_site_to_core — TC-01..09 map to IV-A/C/D.
- Hardware: Support_Hardware_Lab_Equipment, Support_Hardware_Pixel9.
- Fiber plant: Theory_Fiber_Telecom_Infrastructure.
Maintenance
When an equipment IV is exercised:
- Add row under Exercised with asset photo/model and evidence type.
- Remove matching Unexercised row.
- Add procedural detail to open5gs_lab/18_test_plan_mobility_site_to_core or a new
TP-*— not here.
New IV candidates must name a specific asset (manufacturer class optional), not a protocol alone.
Related
- 00-index — subscriber/OSS fraud vectors (different lane)
- 0. Methodology — lab-first phase gates
- open5gs_lab/15_real_world_attack_matrix — real-world attack patterns (includes non-equipment fraud)